Does family involvement on board of the directors contribute to firm profitability? An empirical evidence from Saudi Arabia by Al-Dubai, Shehabaddin Abdullah A. et al.
Cmpomte Board %pi& cDutiRc d Composition/Volume 11, Issuc 2, C o n t i n d l ,  2015 
DOES FAMILY INVOLVEMENT ON BOARD OF THE 
DIRECTORS CONTRIBUTE TO FIRM PROFITABILITY? AN 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM SAUDI ARABIA 
Shehabaddin AbduZZah A. AZ-Dubai *, Ku Nor Izah Ku Ismail**, Noor-qfia Amran*** 
Abstract 
Literatures view board of the directors as the cornerstone of firm's success. Therefore, family 
involvement on the board and its impact on firm profitability is an issue of interest and need to be 
addressed. The purpose of this paper lies in the fact that it extracts new empirical evidence from a 
promising area in the world. The study proceeds with a cross-sectional time-series analysis based on a 
data of 75 Saudi non-financial public listed firms from 2007-2011(375 firm-year observations) to 
examine family representing on board of the directors, family chairman, and founder chairman and its 
impact on firm performance (ROA). The study concludes the outperformance of firms in which family 
represents heavily on the board. In addition, the results suggest that not all family members are good 
stewards. Strictly speaking, founder chairman only found to be beneficial to the firm profitability 
rather than others. However, the results confirmed its robustness against different indicator (EPS) and 
when family firms only being selected. 
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1 Introduction 
The board of directors is considered to be the core of the corporate governance framework, as it forms a 
significant part of the corporate structure conducting important monitoring of, and advisory functions to the top 
management (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008). It is the bridge between the shareholders investing in the firm and 
the managers who are responsible for the day-to-day running of the fm. According to Fama and Jensen (1983), 
a board of directors possesses a great degree of decision control and play a crucial role in the formulation and 
implementation of strategic initiatives in large as well as in small organizations. In other words, they contribute 
to the establishment of the mission and goals, provide their approval to the company's strategic operational and 
financial plans and monitor the overall h performance. 
Burkart and Panunzi (2006) argued that, "being a board member or even its chairman is quite different from 
being the CEO of the lirm and their interests are likely to differ" (p. 3). This is in line with the assumption of the 
agency theory that postulates that the main role of the board of directors is to monitor the CEO. The board is 
among the main mechanisms utilized to effectively control agency costs (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The distribution of functions is such that management is responsible for running the company 
for value creation while the board of directors is responsible to ensure that management does what it is supposed 
to do and that management's goals are aligned with that of the shareholders. Hence, in their monitoring capacity, 
the board of directors can hire, fire the CEO and top executives and decide upon their compensation (Rediker & 
Seth, 1995). 
The contrary view of stewardship theory holds that managers are stewards that better protect the resources and 
act in the firm's best interest as opposed to their own interests (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Hence, theorists 
claim that there is no issue with the motivation of the managers and the board's main role is to work with the 
CEO, support their decision-making process and offer suitable and effective counsel and advice. 
In family h, the family attempts to involve heavily on the board of the directors to maintain firm control 
within the family, either by occupying more seats on the board (Voordeckers, Van Gils, & Van den Heuvel, 
2007) or by confining the chairman positions to family members (Poza, 2010). Along this line, the stewardship 
theory considers family directors (family chairman) more effective advisors of top management as the latter is 
prevented from employing tactics that are adverse to the family shareholders' interest. Eventually, the interest of 
the firm is balanced with those family owners' interests. 
In corporate governance literature, the board of directors has received considerable attention, however, research 
regarding the involvement of the family on the board has not received extensive examination (Collin & Ahlberg, 
2012) and the findings regarding the impact of such involvement upon firm performance are mixed (Coles et al., 
2008). Thus, this ambiguity has urged the researchers to provide new evidence fiom different context (i.e. Arab 
World) on the matter. 
There are several ways in which this study contributes to the existing literature on the topic. First, this study 
provide empirical results on one of the main issues faces by families (i.e., board of the directors) when forming 
their businesses. So, extending research in the area may find answers to questions in modifylug a formal 
governance structure to help guarantee the long-term success of family businesses and welfare of the family. 
Second, we contribute to the existing controversy about the impact of family involvement on the board by 
considering the role of fun's  founder. Third, instead of relying on cross-sectional data as previous studies 
related to ours, we use cross-sectional time-series data i?om unique context (i.e., Saudi Arabia) including five 
consecutive years that is difficult to obtain especially with absence of any related governmental or private 
sources. And fourth, we not only rely on ROA as a measure for h profitability, but we checked the robustness 
of our results by using another measurement that is EPS. 
By testing our hypotheses, we provide empirical evidences support our first and third hypotheses that are family 
representing in board of the directors and founder chai ian  are positively impact performance of the firm. 
However, the findings detect negative relationship between family chairman and firm performance. This indicate 
that founders play unique role in their firms in that they are more stewards and can successfully alleviate any 
possible agency costs that might arise between management of the firm and its shareholders. The results are 
robust when different profitability measure is used (i.e., EPS) and when only family firms being examined. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the following section, we review the preceding literature and 
develop our hypotheses. This is followed by a discussion of the research methodology and results of cross- 
sectional time-series analyses are presented. Finally, a conclusion constitutes the last section. 
2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 Family representation on board of the directors 
For the establishment of board of directors in family businesses, it is important for shareholders to think of a 
suitable structure that may facilitate an effective governance M e w o r k  in the firm for the achievement of 
shareholders' goals. As such, the board of directors may be structured in two different ways; it can be completely 
staffed by related members to the family, either by blood or marriage. This structure dominates in family SMEs 
as the law does not dictate governance disciplines upon them (Voordeckers et al., 2007). Alternatively, the board 
can comprise a group with insiders and outsiders as prevalent in public listed companies (He & Sommer, 2010). 
Oftentimes, in the context of family business, they prefer to confine membership of the board to family members 
(Foza, 2010) owing to the nature of the family business and to keep the control of business within the family. 
Hence, it is the prerogative of the family shareholders to select a suitable board structure that maintains their 
generational transition's strategy and objectives (Voordeckers et al., 2007). 
Hence, the most ideal structure of the board of directors recommended by agency scholars is the inclusion of 
both inside and outside directors (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003) where inside directors are those who are related 
to the family through blood or marriage or those who actively work or retired as executives of the firm 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2004), while the outside ones are those members who are not employees of the company and 
are neither subordinates, relatives nor managers of the subsidiaries of the firm (Pearce & Zahra, 1991). It is 
generally believed that the greater the number of external board members, the more the board will be 
independent h m  management and the more favourable outcomes will be achieved in favour of shareholders, 
such as better quality financial reporting, minimized agency cost, effective internal control and greater firm 
profitability and market value (El-Mahdy &Norman, 2010). 
As for the board independence, a hoard with a greater number of independent directors is considered as a good 
internal monitoring tool that can he used by the organization owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This is because 
agency theory postulates that external directors are more professional in terms of monitoring managers relative 
to their inside counterparts (Eama & Jensen, 1983). In addition, they are better advisors (Coles et al., 2008) and 
they play a role in minimizing conflict between the majority and minority shareholders (Anderson & Reeb, 
2004). This is also owing to the owner's perception of managers; according to the agency theory, managers of 
organizations cannot be trusted (Ramachandran & Jha, 2007). Based on this argument, managers may not act in 
the principal's best interests but in their own at the expense of the former. A contrasting view fiom the 
stewardship theory implies the opposite whereby agents are considered to be trustworthy stewards, and, 
therefore, their goals are primarily aligned with those of the principal (Davis, Schoonnan, & Donaldson, 1997; 
Donaldson & Davis, 1991). In other words, the stewardship theory postulates that the board should comprise a 
majority of inside members as opposed to outside ones to guarantee effective and efficient decision making as 
the former is privy to the business goals and they act in the interests of the firm and must be more competent in 
achieving higher profits compared to their external counterparts (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
In the context of Finland, Maury and Pajuste (2005) revealed that family firms are always represented in the 
management or hoard of directors while Klein (2000) reported that in Germany, two-thirds of the family boards 
have insider members in the form of owners who prefer to maintain the control of the business in the family and 
who largely ignore external control. Navarro, Anson, and Garcia (2009) found a consistent result in Spanish 
public listed companies where the percentage of independent directors is equal in proportion to non-family 
directors. Their findings revealed that a large proportion of the insider directors are members of the family. In 
addition, in Spain, no significant difference was found between family and non-family f m  in the composition 
of the board (Arosa, Iturralde, & Maseda, 2010). Mixed results were revealed in the context of the Asian region. 
For instance, in Malaysia, 55% of the board members are independent non-executive directors (Amran & 
Ahmad, 2009). As for family and non-family businesses, they revealed that the former registered a lower mean 
for board independence compared to the latter. 
Narrowing down the region to Saudi Arabia, the study of Al-Abbas (2009) examined the composition of the 
board of Saudi publicly traded companies within a 3-year span (2005-2007). He found that independent directors 
dominated the board with a mean of 81% indicating that most of the public listed companies in Saudi Arabia 
adhere to the regulations laid down by the corporate governance stating that at least one-third of the board should 
be independent and non-executive members. 
In a related study, Anderson and Reeb (2004) made use of the hmework of the agency theory for their 
examination of 403 non-utilitylnon-banking firms in the S&P 500 from 1992-1999. They found that independent 
directors reduce the possibility of conflicts between the majority and minority shareholders, and, more precisely, 
independent directors positively affect the founding-family f m ' s  performance where the fm balances between 
family and non-family shareholders. This finding is consistent with Fama and Jensen's (1983) argument that 
argued that outside directors could strengthen a firm's value with their experience and monitoring skills. 
In Malaysia, while Amran and Ahmad (2009) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) indicate the absence of any 
significant relationship between the proportion of independent directors and the value of a firm, Ibrahim, Abdul 
Samad and Amir (2009) find that outside directors negatively impact family firms' ROA and ROE. Related 
literature also finds insignificant relationship in the U.S. (Villalonga & Amit, 2006) and Italy (Sciascia & 
Mazzola, 2009). The hypothesis is therefore postulated as follows: 
HI: There is a positive relationship between family representation on boards of directors andfinn performance. 
2.2 Family chairman 
Family chairman is established in family businesses to get the upper hand from non-family businesses. 
Advantages, such as the reduction of owner-manager agency cost through chairman monitoring is facilitated 
(Burlcart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003). 
In addition, Maury (2006) revealed that family controlled finns in Western Europe, outperform their non-family 
rivals although their report regarding the impact of family control upon market-based valuation and accounting- 
based performance resulted in different outcomes. Through a dummy variable, he assigned a value of one if the 
controlling shareholder is a family member or family member holds the position of CEO, Honorary Chairman, 
Chairman or Vice Chairman. Otherwise, a zero was assigned. He concluded that family-controlled firms 
presented higher performance compared to other firms. The positive relationship between accounting profit and 
family control was in fact tied to hold at least one position of CEO or chairman by a family member. In Taiwan, 
Filatotchev, Lien, and Piesse (2005) study the relationship between the independent chairman @as no relation 
with the family owners) and firm performance measured by five indicators: market-to-book value, return on 
capital employed, return on assets, sales revenue and earning per share. They found that family chairman has a 
significant positive effect on the performance measured by sales-to-issued capital ratio only. 
According to the literature, a board without inside members may face the issue of information asymmetry. Berle 
and Means (1932) were among the first researchers to provide an overview of the agent-principal issue stemming 
from information asymmetry. The scenario of asymmetry is such that the agents are privy to private information 
but the principal is not, without a cost. To minimize this cost, the company must be represented by insiders. This 
contention is supported by Hams and Raviv's (2008) model of optimal control of corporate boards of directors 
theorizing that external directors may adversely affect the business value. They recommended that if insiders 
have more important information compared to outsiders, inside-controlled boards is effective. Therefore, when 
family owners take the position of c h a i i  or members of the board, they are privy to any existing information 
regarding the company and they are in the best position to protect the family's resources. 
A recent study by Amran and Ahmad (2009) revealed mixed results contrary to the common belief regarding 
board independence. The findings revealed a negative relation between board independence and firm 
performance. Other studies also revealed the same re& (Booth & Deli, 1996; Filatotchev, Lien, & Piesse, 2005; 
Subrahmanyam, Rangan, & Rosenstein, 1997). They supported Burkart et al.'s (2003) armunent that there is less - .  - -  . - 
owner-manager agency -cost if the family & a i i  undertakes the monitoring role. A similar result was 
presented by Isakov and Weisskopf (2009) who associated the outperformance of family firms to the family 
chairman. In contrast, according to Sacristan-Navarro Gomez-Anson, and Cabeza-Garcia(ZOll), family 
chairman negatively impacts the performance of listed companies in Spain confirming the family shareholders' 
entrenchment and expropriation behaviour. 
Note that, some other works confmed the absence of any statistical significant relationship between family 
chairman and firm performance. For example, Kowalewski, Talavera, and Stetsyuk (2010) in their study on 
Poland revealed that family chairman has no influence on all the three performance measures that are employed, 
i.e. ROE, ROA, and OROA. Similarly, Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, and Cannella (2007) obtained the same 
results for US public companies, they fail to find any relation between the two variables by employing OLS 
regressions, 4 out of 5 regressions produce insignificant relationship which implies that family chairman is 
playing no value-enhancing for the company. Hence, fiom the above discussion of studies in the literature, the 
following is hypothesized: 
HZ: Firms controlled by family chairmen outperform firms not controlled by family chairmen. 
2.3 Founder chairman 
According to Isakov and Weisskopf (2009), family business outperformance is attributed to the family chairman 
of the board of directors. If an external member chairs the board, the family firm does not display better 
performance compared to widely-held companies. As for family generation, family firms with family chairman 
present good performance but market performance is even better when the founder is the chairman of the board 
of directors. Firm profitability shows better performance when the descendant is on the helm as the chairman of 
the board. 
A notable finding was reached by Villalonga and Amit (2006). They revealed that founder-CEO and founder- 
chairman both have a positive effect on firm performance and founder c h a i n  contributes value to the firm 
with a non-family CEO. Such a finding confirms the unique contribution of the founders in their business, as 
they are more concerned and committed (Janjuha-jivraj, 2004). 
When a founder establishes the business, they keep in their mind some significant issues related to their 
business, such as the continuity of the family business, passing the assets to the next generation, and long-term 
growth. To do so, they invest heavily in capital, and research and development @&D) to gain an advantage i+om 
new ideas and technologies to assist rapid company growth (McConaughy & Phillips, 1999) and build an 
enduring long-term business network with the firm's stakeholders, as opposed to their descendants (DeNoble, 
Ehrlich, & Singh, 2007). The short-term views of the descendant chairmen make them more susceptible to 
difficulties and risks while forming networks @e Massis, Chua, & Chrisman, 2008). Consequently, employees 
show greater productivity in family firms managed by founders (McConaughy & Phillips, 1999). 
Miller et al. (2007), however, comprehensively examined the impact of family involvement in management and 
control upon market-based performance. They revealed that family firms in which the founder holds the 
chairman and CEO positions outperform other firms of the same calibre with external CEO and founder- 
chairman. They also revealed that family firms with founder-chairman but descendant-CEO registered the lowest 
mean Tobin's Q. These findings are consistent with Miller et al. (2007) who revealed that as the founder effect 
dissipates, the family-ownership's outperformance dissipates with it. From the above discussion, it is 
hypothesized that: 
H3: Firms controlled by founder chairmen display higher pe$ormance than those controlled by non-founder 
chairmen. 
3 Research methodology 
As the vmose of this study is to extract new evidence on family control and its effect on h performance in 
Arab cint&xt, our data set has been chosen purposively. The companies must be non-financial, traded in 
Saudi Stock Exchange (TadawuO, and have available annual reports for five consecutive years (2007-201 1). Due 
to the irrationality i f  the comp&son between financial and ion-financial firms wartihez, ~tohr,  & ~ & o ~ a ,  
2007), any financial institutions were dropped. This is because government regulations, terms of annual report 
characteristics, and accounting standards in terms of income and profit for financial and non-financial firms are 
different (Alsaeed, 2006; Claessens & Djankov, 1999; Isakov & Weisskopf, 2009; Lemmon & Lins, 2003). ARer 
omitting such financial h s ,  our data set includes 375 h - y e a r  observations. For purpose of this study, we 
adopted the same method of A1-Dubai, Ku Ismail, and Amran (2014) in categorizing our sample h s  into 
family or non-family. The advantage of adopting such method is that, it takes into account the unique 
characteristics of the Arab families in the business whereby they mainly intended to be involved in tirm's 
ownership, management, and board of the directors. 
3.1 Research modek and measurements 
The empirical model of this study to be employed is of the form: 
Where Firm performance is the dependent variable and measured by Return on Assets, a,, = the constant, 
Famchair= family c h a i i ,  Foundchaii founder chairman, Fambod= family representation on board of the 
directors, Bodsize= board size, Fag= f m  age, Fsize= firm size, Fdebt= h ' s  debt, pi = unobserved fm-  
level random effect, El, = idiosyncratic error. 
In order to determine the impact of family control and to ensure that our empirical model is fully specified, three 
independent variables were included in the analysis: family chairman, founder chairman, and family 
representation on board of the directors. However, following previous suggestions, we control for board size, 
firm age, firm size, and firm debt. All operational definitions of the included variables are presented in Table 1. 
4 Results and discussion 
As can be seen fiom Table 2, majority of our sample are firms with non-family chairmen (60%) where families 
occupied only 40% of the total chairman positions in Saudi public listed companies as a whole. However, the 
scenario is different if only family firms have been taken into analysis. Family firms with family c h a i i  
account for around 71% of all family firms while 29% of the family firms have non-family members as 
chairmen. This indicates that Saudi families are more likely to acquire chairman positions. They are in favor of 
keeping the power in the hands of the family members to overrule board decisions, minimize CEO's 
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entrenchment and expropriation behaviour, which in turn will protect family agendas. In addition, Table 2 shows 
the summary statistics for family f m s  with founder and non-founder chairmen. It shows that 59% and 41% of 
family firms have founder and non-founder chairmen, respectively. It seems the majority of Saudi family PLCs 
are governed significantly by non-founder chairmen. 
Table 3 shows the t-statistics for difference in means for all type of firms. The results show that the mean of 
ROA for our sample is 7% as a whole. Although the mean of ROA for h n s  with family chairmen is bigger than 
that of firms with non-family ones, the difference between the means is not significant. However, means of ROA 
for firms with founder and non-founder chairmen are 9% and 6% respectively and significant at 5% level. Such 
results may indicate to the vital role of founders in enhancing their firms' profit. 
Table 3 also expresses the mean of family involvement percentage in board of directors which is 9%. The 
percentage becomes smaller when non-family or non-founder acts as chairman. However, the family 
involvement in board of directors at highest degree (19%) when chairmen of the firms are founders. 
Furthermore, these results are in contrast to the findings of Amran and Ahmad (2009) in Malaysia, Her and 
Williams (2002) in Taiwan and N a v m  and Anson (2009) in Spain which report that the majority of the board 
members are family. However, the above findings support the results of Al-Abbas' (2009) study, whereby the 
Saudi boards of directors consist mainly of independent direct0rs.h terms of board size, the results show that 
8.16% is the mean of board size in all Saudi PLCs. Firms with non-family chairmen have significantly lower 
board size (7.99) than firms with family chaimen (8.41). 
4.2 Regression results and discussions 
Table 4 shows the coefficient of correlation among the variables. It shows positive correlation coefficients for all 
the independent variables with ROA but only significant for founder chairman and family involvement in the 
board of the directors' variables. Correlation coefficients were 0.120 and 0.231 and significant at 5% and 1% 
level of significance for Foundchair and Fambod respectively. However, control variables: Bodsize, Fage, and 
Fsize were positively correlated with ROA and significant at 1% level. Further, Table 4 shows that multi- 
collinearity is not a serious problem in our estimated regression model and would not jeopardise the results as 
the highest observed variance inflation index (VIE) is 2.02, which is far below the value of concern that 
suggested by Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson (2010) (i.e., 10). 
Table 5 provides results of regressing firm performance on family control's variables, namely family 
representation on board of the directors (Eambod), family chairman (Eamchair), and founder chairman 
(Eoundchair). First, in Panel A where ROA is the dependent variable in all the regression models, the 
coefficients of family representation on the board of directors (Eambod) were positive (P= 0.092, P= 0.117) and 
both are significant at the 1% level of significance when it regressed separately and altogether with the other 
independent variables in the full model respectively. As stewardship theory postulates superior performance of 
family directors on the board; the results confirm this superiority in terms of accounting performance (i.e. ROA) 
of Saudi PLCs. The finding is consistent with past work of Sciascia and Mazzola (2009) which implies that 
firm's performance is associated with greater family representation on the board of directors. The reasons behind 
these findings may be that family directors appear to have well-built trustful relations with their relatives that 
equip them with a unique advantage and incentive to effectively monitor and avoid any possible opportunistic 
and exploitative behavior of management. Bearing in mind the strong ancient tribal system in Saudi Arabia, 
family directors are believed to be more knowledgeable of the firm due to flow of information fiom various 
sources. This provides their motivation to work in the best interests of the controlling family shareholders, in 
terms of achieving family objectives, protecting family legacy, longevity and maintaining business survival, in 
order to pass it on to subsequent generations. Hence, family directors contribute to firm performance positively. 
These findings shed light on the inappropriateness of some corporate governance regulations in Saudi Arabia. 
While the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in Saudi Arabia imposes a particular percentage of the board seats 
that must not be exceeded by non-independent members, that is two-thirds of the total board members. The 
evidence of this study suggests that such regulation might be a problematic and may adversely affect the 
performance of Saudi listed companies, more specifically, family firms, which in turn, restrains the intention of 
many family 6rms to go public. Therefore, in order to expand the efficiency of Saudi code, the code should deal 
with family businesses as a special case or different codes should be set up distinct !?om those that apply to non- 
family ones. 
Unexpectedly, while we hypothesized a positive impact of family chairman (i.e. H2), the results of the current 
study confmed the opposite direction. Although majority (71%) of family public listed firms in Saudi Arabia 
have a family members as chairmen, they seem to be lower performer as compared to their non-family 
counterparts. As can be noticed in Panel A of Table 5, the coefficient estimate for Famchair was positive but not 
significant, and turned to be significantly negative (p < 0.01) in our full model. The findings are in contrast to the 
argument made by Burkart et al. (2003) and line with the results provided by Sacristan-Navarro et al.'s (201 1) 
study which revealed the underperformance of family chairmen in Spanish PLCs. Hence, depends on the 
previous findings, family chairman can not be seen as steward any longer. When family chairman controls the 
day-to-day activities he might utilize the business money of the group for his personal private benefits, thereby 
harming h performance (Sacristan-Navarro et al., 201 1). 
With regards to the role of founder chairman, we found a strong significant positive effect of family chairman on 
the ROA (p<O.10) in both separated and full models. The results support the findings of Villalonga and Amit 
(2006) and Miller et al. (2007) for a lone family business. These results indicate that founders seem to contribute 
unique and value-added skills to the firm, thereby explaining the superior performance. Hypothesis H3 is thus 
supported. The reasoning is similar to that of the previous literature, which states that the founder is often the one 
person who knows much about his business and has experienced most of the firm's day-to-day events, starting 
from its establishment. Such long tenure of the founder and his accumulated knowledge equip him with a good 
enough experience to efficiently maintain f m ' s  culture, vision and long-term survival. Therefore, it can be 
noted that in Saudi Arabia, the founder occupies a unique position in the firm and management members always 
consult the founder before most of the decisions are made. Another possible justification behind the result is that, 
most family businesses in Saudi Arabia have a priority to protect their reputation in the market against any 
damage - this motivates them to effectively monitor the management and strive for long-run profit creation and 
firm sustainability, by aligning the interests of the family owners and those of management. In addition, the 
ambitions and leadership of the founder, coupled with the various internal and external resources available, can 
serve as a platform of oppoaunity to the founder to exert considerable influence on the performance of his 6rm. 
In terms of control variables, the coefficient estimates were consistent in all regression models. We found that 
big and older firms with larger board size are doing better than small, young h s  with small board size in terms 
of company profitability. However, the coefficient estimate of fm debt was negative but not significant. 
4.3 Robustness checks 
To prove the robustness of our results and improve its reliability, we reexamine the effects of our independent 
variables with another backward accounting-based ratio as dependent variable, namely Earning Per Share (EPS). 
As it is clearly seen from the results of Panel C from Table 5, all our interested variables, even control variables 
have similar effects to the EPS consistently. The variables explain 11% of the variance in firm performance as 
measured by ROA (R' = 0.1 I), while they explain around 19% of the variance in EPS indicator. The Wald chi' 
tests for goodness-of-fit for both indicators (i.e. ROA and EPS) are highly significant (p < 0.001). As such, we 
can conclude that our findings are robust and can be assumed that similar results can be obtained with any other 
accounting-based ratios of performance. 
Further, given the special characteristics of family firms, we decided to eliminate non-family firms from our 
sample and regress again all the variables of this study but on family firms only. Panels B and D from Table 5 
illustrate the results of such analyses. The two models produced similar results as the two full models of Panels 
A and C with the exception of the family representation on board of the directors @ambod) in terms of statistical 
significance when EPS was the dependent variable. In general we can conclude that the results of this study are 
robust with respect to accounting performance measures and h identity. 
5 Conclusions 
Boards of directors play a critical role in shaping the objective of businesses and maintainjng effective control on 
the management which in turn affect their profitability. In family business, families, generally, tend to restrict the 
seats of the board and even chairman position to members who are related to them. Thus, it would be of 
particular interest to examine family involvement and its impact on the h profitability. 
In the spirit of stewardship theory, we develop two hypotheses regarding the outperformance of a h in which 
family has a great representation on its board and the chairman being family member. Moreover, it will be 
important to investigate the role of h s '  founders. Hence, the third hypothesis was developed to examine such 
role. Using a longitudinal data on 75 Saudi non-financial public listed companies from 2007 to 2011, our 
findings support the stewardship predictions on the positive impact of family presenting on the board of the 
directors and founder chairman. Unexpectedly, our results show that there are different consequences for 
assigning c h a i i  position to family members. While having a family chairman is found to be detrimental to 
firm profitability, have a founder chairman is beneficial. The results imply that founders among other family 
members maintain a distinctive role in their firms, which result in greater efficiency and higher profitability. 
Further, the results are robust to different profitability ratio and sample (only family businesses). 
Due to data limitation, our findings are confined to family involvement on board of the directors. The question of 
whether family involvement on management also improves the relative performance should be a promising 
avenue for future research. Moreover, we suggest future researchers to conduct a cross-country study in Arab 
region or cross-institutional research with different countries out of the region. How chairman position 
moderates the relationship between family ownership and iirm performance is also another useful direction for 
future study. 
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Tablel. Variables' Operational Definitions 
Acronym Operational definition Sources 
Farnbod 
ROA Return on Assets: Net income divided by book value of total assets Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Perez-Gonzalez, 2006 
Famchair Family chairman: dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the chairman of Miller et al., 2007; Kowalewski et al., 2010; Sacristan-Navarro 
the board of the directors in a family firm is a family member, 0 otherwise. et al., 201 1 
Foundchair Founder chairman: dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the chairman of Isakov & Weisskopf, 2009 
the board of the directors is a family member and he is also the founder, 0 
otherwise. 
Family representation on board of the directors: ratio of family directors to the Sciascia & Mazzola, 2009 
total board membership. 
Bodsize Board size: total number of directors on the board of the firm. Al-Abbas (2009); Amran & Ahmad, 2009; Arosa et al., 2010 
Fage Firm age: the natural log of the number of years since the firm's inception. Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Isakov & Weisskopf, 2009; Arosa et 
al., 2010; Sacristan-Navarro et al., 201 1 
Fsize Firm size: the natural log of the book value of total assets. Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Arosa et al., 2010; Sacristan-Navarro 
et al., 201 1 
Fdebt Firm debt: book value of long-term debt divided by total assets. Anderson & Reeb, 2003 
Table 2. Firm Characteristics 
All Firms (n=375) 1 Family Firms (n=2 12) 
Family Non-Family Founder Non-Founder Family Non-Family Founder Non-Founder 
chairman chairman chairman chairman chairman chairman chairman chairman 
Number 150 225 
87 288 
150 62 87 125 
Percent 40.00 60.00 23.20 76.80 70.75 29.25 41.04 58.96 
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Table 3. t-Statistics for Difference in Means 
ROA 0.07 0.07 
Fambod 0.09 0.16 
Bodsize 8.16 8.41 
Fage 24.41 25.84 
Fsize 10,300 3,460 
Mean for 
firms (n=375) 
Fdebt 0.14 0.15 0.13 -1.74* 0.13 0.14 0.87 
Note: ***significant at 1% level (2 tailed), **significant at 5% level (2 tailed), *significant at 10% level (2 tailed), Firm size is total assets expressed in millions of Saudi 
Riyals. ROA= Return on Assets, Fambod= family representation on board of the directors, Bodsize= board size, Fage= firm age, Fsize= firm size, Fdeb* firm debt 
Table 4. Correlations Among Variables 
Mean for family Mean for non-family 
chairman firms chairman firms t-test 
(n= 150) (n= 225) 
ROA 
Mean for founder Mean for non-founder 
chairman firms chairman firms t-test 
(n= 87) (n= 288) 
Famchair Foundchair Fambod Bodsize Fage Fsize Fdebt VIF 
ROA 1 .OOO 
Famchair 0.047 1 .OOO 2.02 
Foundchair 0.120** 0.673*** 1 .OOO 1.99 
Fambod 0.23 I*** 0.419*** 0.409*** 1 .OOO 1.45 
Bodsize 0.156*** 0.130** -0.022 0.087* 1 .OOO 1.22 
Fage 0.230*** -0.007 0.004 0.286*** 0.0 10 1 .OOO 1.14 
Fsize 0.151*** 0.055 -0.025 -0.005 0.375*** -0.134*** 1 .OOO 1.44 
Fdebt 0.049 0.1 14** -0.004 0.155*** 0.092* -0.007 0.410*** 1 .OOO 1.27 
Note: ***significant at 1% level (2 tailed), **significant at 5% level (2 tailed), *significant at 10% level (2 tailed). ROA= Return on Assets, Famchair= family chairman, 
Foundchair= founder chairman, Fambod= family representation on board of the directors, Bodsize= board size, Fage= firm age, Fsize= firm size, Fdebe firm debt 
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Table 5 Results of Cross-Sectional Time-Series Analyses 
ROA EPS 
Panel A : All sample Panel B: FBs Panel C : All sample Panel D: FBs 
Constant -0.160*** -0.151*** -0.143*** -0.129*** 0.235*** -1 1.48*** -1 1.29*** -1 1.47*** -1 1.23*** -5.486*** 
(-3.77) (-3.70) (-3.51) (-3.15) (3.29) (-14.52) (-15.81) (-15.91) (-15.25) (-3.26) 
Famchair 0.005 -0.027*** -0.037*** -0.036 -0.813*** -0.997*** 
(1.13) (-4.38) (-3.86) (-0.34) (-6.15) (-4.48) 
Foundchair 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.880*** 0.626*** 
(5.29) (2.61) (6.79) (3.05) 
Fambod 0.092*** 0.1 17*** 0.080*** 0.765* 1.375*** 0.760 
(5.51) (5.95) (2.84) (1.77) (3.44) (1.30) 
Bodsize 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004 0.01 1 0.0 12 0.003 0.048* 0.106** 
(3.95) (3.36) (3.95) (3.63) (1.57) (0.38) (0.44) (0.1 1) (1.71) (2.01) 
Fage 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.006 1.207*** 1.138*** 1.174*** 1.000*** 0.670*** 
(9.21) (8.56) (6.73) (6.25) (0.83) (18.82) (17.89) (17.43) (10.89) (4.71) 
Fsize 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** -0.010*** 0.451*** 0.441*** 0.451*** 0.451*** 0.218** 
(2.31) (2.20) (2.37) (2.09) (-2.82) (13.41) (14.53) (14.65) (14.79) (2.53) 
Fdebt 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006** 0.046 0.0 12 0.0 19 0.030 -0.056 
(0.35) (-0.99) (-0.93) (-0.55) (-2.03) (1.21) (0.36) (0.54) (0.86) (-1 .OO) 
N 375 375 375 375 208 375 375 375 375 208 
R2 0.066 0.084 0.100 0.110 0.144 0.172 0.173 0.177 0.194 0.160 
Wald chi2 109.91 145.13 127.74 155.12 57.05 603.13 728.38 764.30 65 1.95 62.71 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: Figure in the parenthesis is z value, ***significant at 1% level (2 tailed), **significant at 5% level (2 tailed), *significant at 10% level (2 tailed), ROA= Return on 
Assets, EPS = Earning Per Share, Famcha i~  family chairman, Foundchair= founder chairman, Fambod= family representation on board of the directors, Bodsize= board size, 
Fage= firm age, Fsize= firm size, Fdebt= firm debt. 
